We test a trading strategy of (national) tactical asset allocation based on the popular market wisdom 'Sell in May and go away' also known as the 'Halloween indicator'. With this simple market timing strategy one holds a market portfolio of stocks during November through April and short term government bonds during May through October. We find that this simple market timing rule outperforms riskier market portfolios in almost all 17 countries in our study. Annualized returns in excess of returns on market indices in these countries are substantial. We show that this trading strategy has statistically significant market timing ability and we are able to reject mean variance efficiency of stock market indices for many countries in our study.
INTRODUCTION
"In 30 years in this business, I do not know anybody who has done it successfully and consistently, nor anybody who knows anybody who has done it successfully and consistently. Indeed, my impression is that trying to do market timing is likely, not only not to add value to your investment program, but to be counterproductive." (John Bogle, chairman of the Vanguard Group of Investments Companies, as quoted by Burton Malkiel in 'A Random Walk Down Wall Street ', page 186, 1996, 6 th edition)
We document the existence of a seasonal based on the popular market wisdom 'Sell in May and go away' also known as the Halloween indicator. This seasonal assumes that one invests in the stock market starting October 31 and through April 30 and out of the stock market in short term government bills during the remainder of the year. We compare annual returns of this simple trading strategy with annual returns on stock market indices of 17 countries and a broad world market index. This Halloween strategy outperforms a riskier stock market portfolio in nearly all countries over the period , except in Hong Kong and South Africa. Excess mean returns above the market index run as high as 6.7 percent. Based on a non parametric test of market timing developed by Merton and Henriksson 1 , we find that the Halloween strategy has significant market timing ability in almost all countries considered. The strategy is able to accurately predict half-year bull and bear markets up to 75 percent of the time. Moreover, when we regress annual excess returns of the Halloween strategy on the excess returns on the indices in the different countries we are able to reject mean variance efficiency of market indices in more than half of the countries in our study. While an obvious explanation would be that the Sell in May anomaly is simply the January-effect in disguise we find that this is not the case. The January-effect is of some importance, but even when we take this effect into account a significant Sell in Mayeffect remains present in our data 2 .
One might wonder what the contribution of this study is as it is well known that there are seasonal effects in stock return series. Indeed, already many calendar anomalies have been discovered and documented in the literature. Some well known anomalies are the Monday-effect, the Friday-effect, the Turn of the Month-effect, the Holiday-effect and the January-effect. However, due to transactions costs it is generally difficult to exploit these anomalies in an economically profitable way 3 . The Sell in May-effect is different in that even net of transactions costs investors can earn higher mean returns in comparison to holding a market index. Thus, even after correcting for transactions costs it is possible to 'beat the market' with a trading strategy based on this anomaly. This extremely simple trading rule substantially outperforms a market portfolio in all but two countries in our sample. All the time series and cross sectional return predictability results that we know (even setting aside many technical problems that still exist for many) are not able to generate this level of outperformance, let alone this consistently in 1 Merton (1981) , Henriksson and Merton (1981), Henriksson (1984) . 2 Also correcting for the stock market crash of 1987 does not fundamentally alter our results. 3 Although an investor can implicitly profit from these anomalies by postponing or preponing buying (selling) when he or she has already decided to purchase (sell) certain stocks. countries all over the world. These results are extremely persistent over time. Moreover, this strategy is substantially less risky than simply tracking a market index. It therefore seems that the Sell in May-effect offers opportunities to outperform the market if it continues to exist in the future. And, since the saying 'Sell in May and go away' is and has been well known to the investment community 4 we see no apparent reason why these results might not continue to hold in the future. The longest time span for calendar anomalies generally considered in the literature is one month. For instance, Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) show, that over the years returns in different months tend to be different and especially that returns that coincide with the turn of the tax year (January in nearly all countries) are significantly higher. We show in addition that (even when we take the January effect into account) negative and positive periods are more or less clustered over the year. The innovation is that we break away from the convention of looking at monthly returns and consider longer time spans. This approach can also shed some new light on existing anomalies. If one is willing to take our results to the extreme another interesting observation arises. The existence of a January effect is well established in the financial literature. However, this existence is in fact conditional on the assumption that the January effect is not included in a time span that is itself a calendar anomaly. One could, based on our evidence, argue that conditional on the existence of a Sell in May effect the evidence of a January effect is seriously weakened. More precise, we find that assuming that a Sell in May effect exists halves the number of countries with a statistically significant January effect. Our results can also be interpreted in a different fashion. The Halloween strategy is a simple tactical asset allocation strategy that proposes to switch between equity and cash (when we define cash as a nonequity investment in short term government bills) over the year. In a recent study Graham and Harvey (1996) investigate a sample of 237 investment newsletter strategies (in total 15,133 recommendations) in the period [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] , that also advice on tactical asset allocation between equity and cash. They find that these newsletters fail to offer advice consistent with market timing. Given the results we report here it therefore seems that a simple tactical asset allocation strategy based on the Halloween indicator provides more information on the tactical asset allocation decision than the information in these newsletters.
Nowadays many seasonal effects have been reported in the literature. Hawawini and Keim (1995) provide a recent overview of research in this area and Agrawal and Tandon (1994) report extensive international evidence on many seasonals. The Halloween indicator has to our knowledge not been (thoroughly) investigated before. Levis (1985) only refers to the Sell in May-effect but does not test whether it exists. O'Higgins and Downs (1990) provide some results, but do so only for the United States. They fail to report the statistical significance of their findings. We show that although the effect is present in the United States it is not statistically significant. The little attention this seasonal effect has provoked is surprising, particularly because a trading strategy based on this effect involves relatively small transactions costs and is quite simple to implement. An explanation might be that most of the empirical research uses U.S. data. While also for the U.S. data average returns tend to be higher during the November through April than during May through November (as reported by O'Higgins and Downs, 1990), we do not find a Sell in May-effect significantly present in this data set. Although the effect has to our knowledge never been extensively analyzed, we do find evidence in support of our results in many other studies, for instance, Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) , Hawawini (1991) , Ho (1990) and Rozeff and Kinney (1976) 5 However, none of these studies notices this Sell in May-effect that seems present in the data.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we present the statistical evidence of a Sell in May-effect. In Section 1.3 we compare the results of a trading strategy based on the Sell in May-effect with a Buy and Hold strategy of a market portfolio. Section 1.4 concludes and contains some final remarks. where Jan t denotes the January dummy that takes the value 1 when a returns falls in January and 0 otherwise. For our investigation we use (continuously compounded) monthly stock returns of value weighted market indices 6 of 17 countries (local currencies) and a World Market Index (in US dollars). The countries analyzed are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF A SELL IN MAY-EFFECT
All series are taken from Datastream. They consist of 288 observations over the period January 1973 through December 1996 7 and include dividends. Table 1 contains some summary statistics. In tables 2 and 3 we report our estimation results for the two basic models given by equations (1.1) and (1.2).
7 Although we only report our results for the Datastream monthly indices here, we performed the same analysis on several other data sets with qualitatively similar results. In an earlier draft of this chapter we used daily data without dividend reinvestment over the period 1973-1993. These results are similar and available on request from the authors. Moreover, based on monthly data over the period January 1953 through January 1991 taken from Citibase and the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics we find the Sell in May-effect significantly present at the 10 percent level in six out of the seven investigated countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, (the latter one being not significant). For monthly data over a shorter period (21 years) for sixteen countries based on MSCI-indices we find a significant Sell in May-effect for ten of the sixteen countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and not significant for Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. For both data sets we corrected in our regression analysis for the stock market crash and the January-effect. Also the inclusion of a dummy for the stock market crash in 1987 does not fundamentally alter the results we report here. (White, 1980) . The regression results in table 2 show that at the 10% level a significant Sell in Mayeffect exists in ten of the seventeen countries we consider (Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and Table 3 reports the results of the regression where we included a dummy for the January-effect (Basic model II). Although this reduces the Sell in May-effect to some extent, we find that this effect remains significantly present in nine of the ten countries that exhibit a significant Sell in May-effect and also in the World index. Also note (last column of table 3) that a significant January-effect is present in these value weighted indices for six of the eighteen series, when we assume that there is also a Sell in Mayeffect 8 .
Summarizing the evidence in tables 2 and 3 we can conclude that in many countries there is strong evidence of a Sell in May-effect. This Sell in May-effect seems only partially related to the January-effect.
TRADING STRATEGIES
In this section we compare annual returns of the Halloween strategy with a Buy and Hold strategy:
• Halloween strategy: We assume that an investor who would like to profit from a Sell in May-effect, decides to buy a market portfolio at the end of October and sells this portfolio at the beginning of May. This investor will then invest in a risk free asset (short term treasury bonds) 9 from the end if April through the end of October.
• Buy and Hold strategy: This strategy holds the stock market portfolio throughout the 24 year period. Table 4 contains the average annual returns and the standard deviation of the Buy and Hold strategy and the Halloween strategy. These results show that the Halloween strategy outperforms the Buy and Hold strategy in all countries except Hong Kong and 8 When we do not include a Sell in May dummy we find a significant January-effect (10 percent level) in eleven countries. 9 We used monthly short term interest rates (interbank or treasury bill rates) taken from either the OECD or the IMF. We used IMF interest rates when these rates are available for the full sample period, otherwise we take OECD short term interest rates. For Switzerland we had to construct a time series of interest rates from both sources as they were not available over the full sample. For Singapore we used the discount rate. For Hong Kong we used a national source: Hong Kong savings deposit rate (paid). As noted by Solnik (1993) the type of interest rates reported by the OECD tend to be different across countries. Therefore we checked our results for most countries using six months Euro-currency interest rates. Unfortunately these are only available since 1981. However, the results obtained with the Eurocurrency rates were qualitatively similar to the results reported here. More detailed information on the interest rates is available on request from the authors.
South Africa. The standard deviation of the Halloween strategy is substantially lower than the standard deviation of the Buy and Hold strategy in all countries.
This results are confirmed when we compare cumulative frequency distributions of the two different strategies. Here, in figure 1 we only plot the cumulative frequency distribution for Italy. However, similar results, though somewhat less pronounced, are obtained for other countries.
An important question that has not been answered so far is, whether these results are statistically significant. There are several ways to test the statistical significance of these findings. Here we first test whether we are able to reject mean variance efficiency of the indices in the different countries. More specifically we use: As the null hypothesis that α should be equal to zero is frequently rejected this shows that in most countries mean variance efficiency of the stock market index is rejected. The estimates of β are well below one. This confirms our conclusion that the Halloween strategy is substantially less risky than investing in the market index in the respective countries.
Another way to test whether the Halloween indicator has forecasting power is to investigate the market timing ability of the Halloween strategy. Merton (1981) , and Henriksson and Merton (1981) developed a (non parametric) test for the evaluation of market timing ability of investment managers 10 . In their analysis, the investor predicts when stocks will out-or underperform bonds but does not predict the magnitude of the superior performance
11
. The probability of a correct forecast given that the stock return is below the risk free rate is defined as p 1 , and the probability of a correct forecast given that the stock return is above the risk free rate as p 2 . 10 As we already know the potential source of superior performance the Merton-Henriksson methodology is in our simple case similar to the methodology of Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) . 11 Note that no assumptions about the structure of equilibrium security prices are required, because ex ante the investment manager's predictions are known. We analyze whether the Halloween strategy has significant market timing ability. The analysis takes the possibility that forecasting skills are different for bull markets and for bear markets into account. The Halloween strategy predicts that Treasury bills will outperform the stock market in the period ranging from May to October, and that the stock market will outperform in the remaining period each year. The results of the non parametric test for 17 countries and the World index are set out in table 6 for the period between 1973 through 1996.
12 If the forecasts are known and forecasters behave rationally, then a one tail test as we use is most appropriate. Otherwise, a two tailed test would be necessary. See Henriksson and Merton (1981) . Table 6 . Market timing ability: non parametric test of predictability of the Halloween strategy over the years . Every year is divided into two parts: May through October and November through April. For the first period the Halloween strategy predicts a bear market (a return on the market lower than the risk free rate) For the second period the Halloween strategy predicts a bull market (return higher than the risk free rate). On average, the Halloween strategy renders well when judged on its ability to time bear and bull markets. The Halloween strategy appears to have better skills in forecasting bull markets than bear markets, because the values in the first column are lower than those of the second column in most markets. The score on the market timing ability measure is above one or equal to one in all cases. In Belgium the strategy scores best, i.e. a market timing ability of almost 1.50. When these values are compared with those of table 4, we notice almost no differences. In general, when the annual outperformance of the Halloween strategy is high so is its market timing ability. Because we examine only 24 years our sample size is quite small (i.e. N=48). Nevertheless, the null hypothesis of no forecasting ability can still be rejected at a 90 percent significance level for 13 countries and the World index.
While results reported here do not include transactions costs they can easily be implemented. For instance, assuming conservative transactions costs of 0.5 percent for a single transaction 13 the annual return on the Halloween would drop with approximately 1 percent 14 . For a practical implementation of the Halloween strategy it would however be 13 One might argue that the costs of switching are in fact higher (two times 0.5%). However, we know of certain asset managers that charge transactions costs only once when an investor switches funds. Moreover, as noted by Pettengill and Jordan (1988) : ''certain families of mutual funds allow cost free switching from equity to money market funds''. 14 Berkowitz et al. (1988) estimate the cost of a transaction on the NYSE to be 0.23 percent. One of the largest institutional investors world wide, i.e., the Robeco Group, estimates transactions costs in France 0.3%, Germany 0.5%, Italy 0.4%, Japan 0.3%, the Netherlands 0.3% and the United States 0.25%. In the United Kingdom the costs of a buy or sell transaction are 0.75% or 60%   73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95 Year Halloween minus Buy and Hold strategy more appropriate to mimic this strategy using index futures. In that case transactions costs are much lower. For instance, Solnik (1993) estimates the round-trip transactions costs of 0.1% on futures contracts.
All results above could still be the consequence of one or two exceptional years. To investigate this issue we compare the annual out-and underperformance of the Halloween strategy with respect to the Buy and Hold strategy in every year for Italy (similar results are obtained for the other countries) in figure 2. As can be seen in this figure the high returns of the Halloween strategy cannot be attributed to one or several specific years. Figure 3 shows the end of period wealth of an initial investment of 1 local currency unit during twenty four years in Italy. Clearly, following a consistent Halloween strategy would have resulted in substantial higher wealth at the end of this 24 year period.
CONCLUSIONS
The results reported here reveal that a trading strategy of tactical asset allocation based on the old wisdom "Sell in May and go away" generates abnormal returns in comparison with stock market indices in most countries in our study. We find that this Halloween strategy (as it has been called by O'Higgins and Downs, 1990 ) beats a market index in 0.25%, respectively. These estimates give an indication, and are not precisely accurate due to the complexity of tax and commission systems. Halloween Strategy every investigated country, except in Hong Kong and South Africa. This is surprising as this outperformance is possible with a strategy that is less risky than simply holding the market index, measured by either standard deviation or beta. After correcting for risk we show that this outperformance is statistically significant in many countries. The non parametric test developed by Merton and Henriksson shows that this Halloween strategy is indeed very well able to predict half year bull and bear markets. Again, these predictability results are statistically significant in many countries in our study. It therefore seems that stock returns are to some extent predictable from their own past.
Some final considerations remain. A possible explanation of the observed Sell in May seasonal might be that higher returns are a compensation for a higher risk during November through April. In that case one would expect the variance of the indices in this period to be significantly higher than during the remainder of the year. For all data sets we considered (in this study and in earlier drafts) we found this explanation to be unlikely. In most countries the variance tends to be somewhat lower during the November through April period than during the remainder of the year. Modeling the time varying volatility more explicitly by use of GARCH(1,1) model and a GARCH(1,1) in mean process for daily data in an earlier draft we reached a similar conclusion.
One could argue that the Datastream market indices we use are not a proper benchmark and that also the Halloween strategy that invests half of the time in this index is therefore in practice an unobtainable investment strategy. The argument would be that is impossible to own a value weighted country index with dividends reinvested as the cost of continuously re-balancing this portfolio would be huge. The main reason to use indices with dividends reinvested is that the exclusion of dividends might, and in fact does, bias our results. This happens because in most countries dividend payments occur mainly during the May through October period. Excluding dividends would therefore bias the results in favor of the Halloween strategy. We also worked with market indices that do not correct for dividend payments (MSCI-indices and the Citibase indices). The results based on these indices favored the Halloween strategy even more strongly. While it is indeed difficult to mimic a value weighted index in practice there are several points to be made about this flaw in our analysis. First, one could implement this trading strategy using index futures. This would also reduce transactions costs. Second in many countries in our study nowadays index tracking funds exist and the correlation between these index tracking funds and the indices we use here seems extremely high 15 . Third most of the indices we used are used in practice to measure the results of portfolio managers all around the world. Fourth, most of the academic research uses value weighted indices. May be a more important problem with the implementation of this strategy is the large size of the tracking errors in some years in comparison with the market indices. This might for institutional investors be a serious drawback for implementing a Halloween strategy as professional clients generally do not appreciate large tracking errors. In this case a solution might be to use portfolio insurance during the May through October period. In a recent paper Waksman, Sandler, Ward and Firer 
